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NOTES
THE CONFINEMENT OF MABEL JONES: IS THERE A RIGHT
TO JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS?
VICKI GORDON KAUFMAN
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent decision by the Florida Supreme Court exposed an area
of grave deficiency in Florida's mental health law. In re Jones, in-
volved the fate of Mabel Jones, an elderly, blind woman. Indigent
and on welfare, Ms. Jones was confined to a nursing home because
her family could not care for her adequately. When Ms. Jones devel-
oped bedsores, she was taken to a hospital and treated for several
days. Because she had been unruly at times in the nursing home,
when Ms. Jones was well enough to be released from the hospital,
the nursing home refused to readmit her.
Since Ms. Jones could neither remain in the hospital nor return
to the nursing home, on November 3, 1975, the hospital administra-
tor filed a petition in the state circuit court for Leon County, Flor-
ida, seeking an order, for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to
section 394.467(2) of the Florida Statutes.' On November 4, 1975,
1. 339 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1661 (1977).
2. (1977). The statute provides:
ADMISSION TO A TREATMENT FACILITY.-A patient may be hospitalized in
a treatment facility, after notice and hearing, upon recommendation of the admin-
istrator of a receiving facility where the patient has been admitted for examination
or evaluation. When a patient is not an inpatient in a receiving facility, the admin-
istrator of a designated receiving facility may make a recommendation for involun-
tary hospitalization of a patient who has been given an examination, evaluation,
or treatment by staff of the receiving facility or a private physician. The hearing
may be waived in writing by the patient. The recommendation must be supported
by the opinions of two physicians who have personally examined the patient within
the preceding 5 days that the criteria for involuntary hospitalization are met. Such
recommendation shall be entered on a hospitalization certificate, which certificate
shall authorize the receiving facility to retain the patient pending transfer to a
treatment facility or completion of a hearing. The certificate shall be filed with the
court in the county where the patient is located and shall serve as a petition for a
hearing regarding involuntary hospitalization. A copy of the certificate shall also
be filed with the department, and copies shall be served on the patient and his
guardian or representatives, accompanied by:
(a) A written notice, in plain and simple language, that the patient or his guard-
ian or representative may apply at any time for a hearing on the issue of the
patient's need for hospitalization if he has previously waived such a hearing.
(b) A petition for such hearing, which requires only the signature of the patient
or his guardian or representative for completion.
(c) A written notice that the petition may be filed with a court in the county in
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Ms. Jones' attorney filed a request for a jury determination of the
factual issue involved in the commitment proceeding: whether Ms.
Jones met the criteria for involuntary hospitalization. The trial
court denied the request for a jury trial on November 12, 1975.'
This was the initial judicial ruling on the constitutional validity
of Florida's statutory civil commitment procedure, which fails to
provide for a jury trial when requested. After hearing testimony, the
court entered an order of commitment for involuntary hospitaliza-
tion.4 Challenging the statute as unconstitutional because it failed
which the patient is hospitalized at the time the certificate is executed and the
name and address of the judge of such court.
(d) A written notice that the patient or his guardian or representative may apply
immediately to the court to have an attorney appointed if the patient cannot afford
one.
The petition may be filed in the county in which the patient is hospitalized at any
time within 6 months of the date of the certificate. The hearing shall be held in
the same county, and one of the patient's physicians at the hospital shall appear
as a witness at the hearing. If the hearing is waived, the court shall order the patient
to be transferred to a treatment facility or, if he is at a treatment facility, that he
be retained there. However, the patient can be immediately transferred to the
treatment facility by waiving his hearing without awaiting the court order. The
hospitalization certificate shall serve as authorization for the patient to be trans-
ferred to a treatment facility and as authorization for the treatment facility to
admit the patient. The treatment facility may retain a patient for a period not to
exceed 6 months from the date of admission. If continued hospitalization is neces-
sary at the end of that period, the administrator shall apply to the hearing examiner
for an order authorizing continued hospitalization.
FLA: STAT. § 394.467(2) (1977).
3. 339 So. 2d 1117.
4. Id. The statutory provisions for such hearings are as follows:
PROCEDURE FOR HEARING ON HOSPITALIZATION.-
(a) If the patient does not waive a hearing or if the patient, his guardian, or a
representative files a petition for a hearing after having waived it, the judge shall
serve notice on the administrator of the facility in which the patient is hospitalized
and on the patient. The notice of hearing must specify the date, time, and place of
hearing; the basis for detention; and the names of examining physicians and other
persons testifying in support of continued detention and the substance of their
proposed testimony. The judge may serve notice on the State Attorney of the
judicial circuit of the county in which the patient is hospitalized, who shall repre-
sent the state. The court shall hold the hearing within 5 days unless a continuance
is granted. The patient, his guardian or representative, or the administrator may
apply for a change of venue for the convenience of parties or witnesses or because
of the condition of the patient. Venue may be ordered changed within the discretion
of the court. The patient and his guardian or representative shall be informed of
the right to counsel by the court. If the patient cannot afford an attorney, the court
shall appoint one. The patient's counsel shall have access to hospital records and
to hospital personnel in defending the patient. One of the physicians who executed
the hospitalization certificate shall be a witness. The patient and his guardian or
representative shall be informed by the judge of the right to an independent expert
(psychiatrist or psychologist) examination. If the patient cannot afford a doctor, the
judge shall appoint one. If the court concludes that the patient meets criteria for
involuntary hospitalization, the judge shall order the patient to be transferred to a
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to provide for jury trial, Ms. Jones appealed directly to the Florida
Supreme Court on December 11, 1975.1 The court sustained the
constitutionality of section 394.467, holding that there is no right to
a trial by jury in a civil commitment proceeding. Ms. Jones was then
hospitalized involuntarily at the Florida State Hospital at Chatta-
hoochee.
Jones illustrates a needless defect in Florida's mental health law:
the denial of a jury trial to resolve the issues involved in a commit-
ment decision. With Jones as a starting point, this note will briefly
explore the history of the jury trial in commitment proceedings and
the jury trial's basis in the Federal Constitution. Florida's mental
health statute and scant case law in the jury trial area also will be
treatment facility, or, if he is at a treatment facility, that he be retained there, or
to be treated at any other appropriate facility or service on an involuntary basis.
The order shall adequately document the nature and extent of a patient's mental
illness. The judge may adjudicate a person incompetent pursuant to the provisions
of this act at the hearing on hospitalization. The treatment facility may accept and
retain a patient admitted involuntarily for a period not to exceed 6 months when-
ever the patient is accompanied by a court order and adequate documentation of
the patient's mental illness. Such documentation shall include a psychiatric evalu-
ation and any psychological and social work evaluations of the patient. If further
hospitalization is necessary at the end of that period, the administrator shall apply
to the hearing examiner for an order authorizing continued hospitalization.
(b) In the event a person is ordered into a treatment facility under the provisions
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, or chapter 801 or chapter 917, the order
shall adequately document the nature and extent of a patient's mental illness. No
person charged with a misdemeanor shall be committed to the department solely
by Rule 3.210 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, but shall be admitted
for hospitalization and treatment in accordance with the provisions of this part.
The treatment facility may accept and retain a patient so admitted for a period
not to exceed 6 months whenever the patient is accompanied by a court order and
adequate documentation of the patient's mental illness. Such documentation shall
include a psychiatric evaluation and any psychological and social work evaluations
of the patient and document the results of any criminal investigation on the pa-
tient. If a patient is considered to be suffering from an emotional illness to the
extent that he cannot participate in his own defense, such documentation should
include details regarding the evaluation which led to that conclusion. If further
hospitalization is necessary, at the end of his authorized treatment period, the
administrator shall apply to the hearing examiner for an order authorizing contin-
ued hospitalization.
(c) The court shall provide a court order, a psychiatric evaluation, and other
adequate documentation of each patient's mental illness to the administrator of a
treatment facility whenever a patient is ordered for involuntary hospitalization,
whether by civil or criminal court. The administrator of a treatment facility may
refuse admission to any patient directed to its facility on an involuntary basis,
whether by civil or by criminal court order, who is not accompanied at the same
time by adequate orders and documentation.
FiA. STAT. § 394.467(3) (1977).
5. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) authorizes the Florida Supreme Court to hear an appeal
from a final judgment of a trial court when the trial court rules initially on the validity of a
state statute.
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analyzed. Finally, reasons for granting a jury trial upon request in
commitment proceedings will be discussed and recommendations
for change will be suggested.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
During feudal times, the king was entitled to the profits of an
idiot's land, after allowing for the idiot's support. However, before
this could be done, the sheriff had to submit the question of the
person's sanity to the "folkmoot," a group of twelve men who deter-
mined the person's mental status.6 This process was thought to
safeguard the subjects' property from unwarranted seizure by the
king.7 The same procedure was followed for a lunatic, who was
usually distinguished from an idiot. As the English viewed it at the
time, "[l]unacy differed from idiocy in that insanity usually came
in later life, was often only temporary, and the lunatic was popu-
larly regarded as being possessed by an exorcisable demon."' In
contrast, an idiot was often perceived as a "natural fool."' In a
lunatic's case, the king held the land in trust, and the profits from
the trust were applied to maintaining the lunatic and his house-
hold.'0
In later English practice, an application was made to the chancel-
lor for a commission of lunacy. This procedure still involved the
summoning of a jury to sign the inquisition." The alleged lunatic
also had the right to challenge the commission's finding (traverse
the return) and the right to a trial by jury. There is some indication
that the chancellor may have had discretion in allowing the appeal,
and this has created confusion as to whether there was an absolute
right to a jury trial.'2
These English proceedings dealt solely with control over a per-
son's property. The proceedings differed for confinement. Usually
confinement was imposed to prevent harm. Yet for many years any
private person or police officer could lawfully apprehend a danger-
ously insane person-apparently without a warrant. In 1714, jus-
tices of the peace were given authority by statute to issue warrants
for arresting and confining dangerous lunatics. In 1744, a subse-
6. Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1145, 1146-47 (1954); S. BR&KuL & R. ROCK, THE MENTmLY DISA-
BLED AND THE LAw 3 (rev. ed 1971) [hereinafter cited as BRAKEL & ROCK].
7. Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1145, 1147 (1954).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.; BRAKE! & ROCK, supra note 6, at 2.
11. Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1145, 1147 (1954).
12. Id. at 1148.
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quent statute gave two or more justices of the peace the authority
to issue such a warrant. Evidently, the proper avenue of relief for
the prisoner was to procure a chancellor's commission ordering an
inquisition. This was done through a friend-if a friend was avail-
able. 3 If not, escape from confinement undoubtedly was difficult.
The English procedure of an inquest by jury was generally fol-
lowed in the original American states."4 In states that did not suc-
ceed to the established colonial system, generally there was no right
to a jury trial on the issues of guardianship or confinement. 5 Many
state courts hold that the right to a jury in civil commitment pro-
ceedings will be preserved if state common law provided for a jury
trial at the time the state's constitution was adopted." Further-
more, some state courts hold that the right to a jury in commitment
proceedings is preserved by the constitutional provisions for juries
if a statute provided for the right when the constitution was
adopted.'7
HI. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR JURY TRIALS IN COMMITMENT
PROCEEDINGS
The United States Constitution does not expressly guarantee a
jury trial in civil commitment proceedings, 8 and the United States
Supreme Court has ruled that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment does not require any particular type of proceed-
ing in a state court. 9 Due process requires only that the person be
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1149. For a collection of cases, see id. at 1149-55.
15. Id. at 1155. For a collection of cases, see id. at 1155-59.
16. BRAKEL & RocK, supra note 6, at 54 and cases cited therein.
17. Id. For the history of civil commitment, see generally id. at 1-14; K. MILLER, MANAG-
ING MADNESS: THE CASE AGAINST CIVIL COMMITMENT 4-8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MANAGING
MADNESS]; Schneider, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 58 A.B.A.J. 1059 (1972).
18. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1145 (1954) (discussion of the constitutional right to a jury
in insanity proceedings).
19. Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901). Ms. Simon was the subject of a petition for an
inquisition of lunacy. Ms. Simon was notified of her trial, but the court decided that it was
inconsistent with her health to have her present. A guardian was appointed, and he denied
all the charges. A jury judged Ms. Simon insane. Another guardian was appointed, and Ms.
Simon's real estate was sold to pay for debts, support, and maintenance. Six years later, Ms.
Simon brought an ejectment action. Her counsel contended that the lunacy proceedings were
invalid because Ms. Simon had not been notified to be present at the trial and because the
court had left it to the judgment of the sheriff as to whether Ms. Simon would appear. The
Supreme Court held that since Ms. Simon was notified of the hearing, she could have come
into court to defend herself had she so chosen. Striking down Ms. Simon's other contentions,
the Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require a
state court to provide a certain type of proceeding as long as there is notice and an opportunity
to defend.
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given notice and an opportunity to defend. 0
Courts have frequently compared juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings to civil commitment proceedings. For example, both are nonad-
versary and noncriminal, and the purpose of both is supposedly
rehabilitative rather than punitive.2' The United States Supreme
Court recently held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania that a jury trial
is not required in juvenile delinquency proceedings.2 2 However,
three justices dissented in McKeiver, arguing that since the juve-
niles faced lengthy confinements, they should have been granted a
jury trial. Justices Black, Douglas, and Marshall based their dissent
in part on the belief that "[n]o adult could be denied a jury trial
in those circumstances. '2 3
It seems, however, that adults are denied a jury trial in even more
suspect circumstances-a civil commitment proceeding where the
length of the commitment may be indeterminate or even lifelong.24
The guarantee of a jury trial provided by the sixth amendment is
applicable only to criminal prosecutions. 5 Insanity is not a crime.
Therefore, the sixth amendment does not apply to civil commit-
20. Chaloner v. Sherman, 242 U.S. 455 (1916); Twining v. N.J., 211 U.S. 78 (1908); New
Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U.S. 336 (1902); Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427
(1901). The due process requirements are satisfied by FLA. STAT. § 394.467(2)-(3) (1977). For
text of statute, see notes 2 and 3 supra.
21. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally 11, 44
TEx. L. REv. 424, 448-49 (1966). Cohen does point out, however, that the juvenile court tends
to give individualized care to the child and often uses alternatives to help the child. Cohen
states that a judge involved in a civil commitment does not assume the same role as a juvenile
court judge.
22. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
23. Id. at 560 (citation omitted).
24. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Kenneth Donaldson was com-
mitted in civil proceedings against his will and remained in confinement for almost 15 years.
Donaldson was not a danger to himself or to others. He was committed by his father in 1957
for "care, maintenance, and treatment." Donaldson was confined in the Florida State Hospi-
tal at Chattahoochee, which is where Mabel Jones was confined. Donaldson brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970), alleging that he had been "intentionally and maliciously" deprived of his constitu-
tional right to freedom. The jury awarded Donaldson punitive and compensatory damages
totalling $38,500. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493
F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded on the issue of whether
monetary damages were appropriate. Donaldson finally secured his release in 1971. See also
K. DONALDSON, INSANITY INSIDE OUT (1976); MANAGING MADNESS, supra note 17, at 20-26.
25. White v. White, 196 S.W. 508 (Tex. 1917). White was a habeas corpus proceeding. Ms.
White had been judged insane on the report of six commissioners, all of whom were doctors.
Ms. White contended that she was entitled to a trial by jury. Since the sixth amendment
applies only to criminal prosecutions, the court held that the United States Constitution does
not guarantee the right of trial by jury in any noncriminal state court proceeding. The court
did find, however, that Ms. White was entitled to a jury trial under Texas law because of a
provision in the Texas constitution. The right to a jury trial in a lunacy proceeding existed
prior to the adoption of the Texas constitution and therefore was incorporated in it.
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ment proceedings.
The seventh amendment deals with jury trials in civil proceed-
ings. However, for the seventh amendment to apply, the proceeding
must be a suit at common law, and the value in controversy must
exceed twenty dollars. In Ward v. Booth, the court found the sev-
enth amendment inapplicable to a proceeding appointing a guard-
ian for an insane person."6 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a guardianship proceeding bears no relationship to a
suit at common law and that there is no "value" in controversy. The
same rationale may be applied to a commitment proceeding. So a
jury trial is not required." Consequently, the seventh amendment
affords no constitutional basis for a jury trial in civil commitment
proceedings. Nevertheless, a state may grant a jury trial even if it
is not specifically mandated by the United States Constitution. 8
IV. RIGHTS IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS IN FLORIDA
Chapter 394 of the 1977 Florida Statutes contains the Florida
Mental Health Act, commonly known as the Baker Act. This act
sets forth commitment procedures in Florida. The statute provides
for four types of confinement. One of these four types may be consid-
ered voluntary. The others are coercive. Voluntary admission may
be accomplished if the person or his guardian applies to the appro-
priate residential institution. 9 Evidence of mental illness must be
found, and the illness must be suitable for treatment. The patient
admitted voluntarily may request a discharge at any time. If the
request is denied, involuntary hospitalization proceedings must be
initiated."
The three types of involuntary confinement are emergency admis-
sion, 31 admission for a court-ordered evaluation, 3 and involuntary
hospitalization. 33 Though the procedures for and duration of these
types of confinement differ, these confinements all involve the same
admission criteria: the person must be "mentally ill and because of
his illness is: (1) [l]ikely to injure himself or others if allowed to
remain at liberty, or (2) [i]n need of care or treatment and lacks
sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own
26. 197 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1952).
27. Id. at 967.
28. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 6, at 54.
29. FLA. STAT. § 394.465(1)(a) (1977).
30. Id. § 394.465(2)(a).
31. Id. § 394.463(1).
32. Id. § 394.463(2).
33. Id. § 394.467.
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behalf."34 A suit brought after the decision in Jones challenged these
criteria as vague and overbroad, but the Florida Supreme Court
held that the standards were constitutionally sufficient.35 In so hold-
ing, the court stated that the statutory criteria were not vague be-
cause the statute gave adequate warning of the type of behavior that
would give rise to confinement. 6 In rejecting the claim of over-
breadth as well, the court relied on section 394.453 of the Florida
Statutes,31 which recites the legislative intent that involuntary hos-
pitalization occur only when it is necessary. The court reasoned that
confinement would not be necessary if the person could safely sur-
vive in freedom. 38 Construing the criteria more broadly than neces-
sary, the court interpreted the phrase "[1]ikely to injure himself or
others ' 13 to mean not only the threat of physical injury, but also that
of emotional injury.4" Additionally, the court concluded that "[lack
of] sufficient capacity to act for himself" is present when there is a
threat of substantial harm to a person's well-being and he cannot
determine whether treatment is desirable.4' This too is a broader
standard than necessary." Instead of reaching such broad conclu-
sions, the court should have construed these threshold requirements
so that involuntary confinement would be ordered in only the most
serious cases. This would have been much more consistent with the
clearly expressed legislative intent.
The procedural distinctions among the three kinds of involuntary
admissions involve differences in who initiates the process and in
the length of confinement. Emergency admission may be initiated
by a judge, law enforcement officer, or physician, if he believes the
34. Id. §§ 394.463(1)(a), (2)(a), .467(1).
35. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977). Though the constitutional challenge was
specifically addressed to § 394.467(1), the court's analysis would probably apply to §
394.463(1)(a) and § 394.463(2)(a) as well. The criteria in those two sections are identical to
those in § 394.467(1).
Section 394.467 was not challenged as vague and overbroad in In re Jones, 339 So. 2d 1117
(Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1661 (1977). Ms. Jones limited her constitutional challenge
to the jury trial issue.
36. 342 So. 2d at 485.
37. (1977).
38. 342 So. 2d at 486.
39. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)(a) (1977).
40. 342 So. 2d at 487.
41. Id. The court was referring to the criteria set forth in § 394.467(1)(b).
42. Dealing with several other important issues, the Beverly court held that the standard
of proof in commitment cases is one of clear and convincing evidence, not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. This increases the likelihood of commitment in any given case. The court
also held that no Miranda warnings need be given to the alleged mentally ill person and that
the person has no right to counsel at an interview with a psychiatrist. Other Florida Supreme
Court decisions holding § 394.467 constitutional are In re Alvarez, 342 So. 492 (Fla. 1977); In
re Jackson, 342 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1977); In re Scott, 342 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1977).
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person meets one of the admission criteria set forth by statute. 3
Emergency admission can last no longer than forty-eight hours. No
hearing is required."
In contrast, a court-ordered evaluation may be made only if a
judge determines, after a hearing, that the criteria for commitment
have been met. The patient must be notified of the hearing and has
the right to counsel.45 If an evaluation is ordered, it can last no
longer than five days.4" The period of confinement in an emergency
or court-ordered evaluation admission is relatively short compared
to an involuntary commitment.
The involuntary commitment procedure is initiated by the ad-
ministrator of a hospital, who may recommend involuntary hospi-
talization after the patient has been examined.47 This recommenda-
tion must be supported by the opinions of two physicians who have
examined the patient. The administrator's recommendation serves
as a petition for a hearing on the involuntary hospitalization. Unless
waived by the patient, a hearing is held, and the judge determines
if hospitalization is necessary. The patient is entitled to be repre-
sented by an attorney at this hearing. If the patient is hospitalized
involuntarily, the period of confinement may not exceed six
months.48 Thereafter, the administrator must apply to the hearing
examiner for an order authorizing continued hospitalization. In
short, the involuntary commitment procedure, which can result in
a severe loss of personal freedom, provides no opportunity for the
person to request a jury determination of whether the commitment
criteria have been met.
The Florida Supreme Court has had only two opportunities to
address the question of whether jury trials are constitutionally man-
dated in civil commitment proceedings. The first opportunity came
in 1908 in Ex Parte Scudamore.50 The plaintiff in Scudamore con-
tended that failure to provide for a jury trial in commitment pro-
ceedings violated section three of the Declaration of Rights of the
43. FLA. STAT. § 394.463(1)(b) (1977).
44. Id. § 394.463(1)(d).
45. Id. § 394.463(2)(c).
46. Id. § 394.463(2)(e).
47. Id. § 394.467(2). For text of statute, see note 2 supra.
48. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(4)(f) (1977).
49. Id. § 394.467(2). Presumably Mabel Jones has now been confined in the Florida
State Hospital at Chattahoochee for more than six months. Therefore, the hospital adminis-
trator should by now have applied for an order authorizing continued hospitalization. Offi-
cials at the hospital refused to say whether such an order has been sought. Records in the
case are apparently sealed.
50. 46 So. 279 (Fla. 1908).
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Florida constitution of 1885, which stated that "[t]he right of trial
by jury shall bee [sic] secured to all and remain inviolate forever."
The Scudamore court held that section three applied only to cases
in which the right to a jury trial existed prior to the adoption of the
constitution.5' The right to a jury trial in civil commitment proceed-
ings did not exist in Florida in 1885. Therefore, section three did not
apply to such proceedings.52
The Florida Supreme Court did not face the issue again for nearly
seventy years-until In re Jones. 5 3 The same provision for a jury trial
is incorporated in the Declaration of Rights of the Florida constitu-
tion of 1968 as was included in the 1885 constitution.54 A comparison
reveals several important differences in the commitment process as
it existed in 1908, at the time of Scudamore, and as it exists today
under the Baker Act.55 Rather than compare the differences in the
commitment process in 1908 and 1976, however, the Jones court
based its perfunctory opinion almost totally on the outdated
Scudamore case.5"
Two statutes were involved in Scudamore-General Statutes 1200
and 1201. 51 Statute 1200 dealt with the initial petition for commit-
ment and required five reputable citizens to sign a petition request-
ing an examination of the alleged insane person. These five people,
only one of whom could be a relative, had to acknowledge personally
that they believed the person in question to be insane. Statute 1201
provided that two physicians and a lay person be appointed to an
examining committee to ascertain the mental status of the person
named in the petition. Although these lay people did not constitute
a formal jury, they performed the function of a jury by providing a
representative voice for the community as a whole in the commit-
ment decision.5"
Thus, in 1908, the community was very much involved in deter-
mining whether a person was mentally ill, and, if so, whether hospi-
talization was necessary. Under section 394.467(2)-(3), the hospital
administrator initiates the commitment proceeding, the alleged
51. Id. at 283.
52. Id. at 279.
53. 339 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1661 (1977).
54. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22.
55. For text of statute, see notes 2 and 3 supra.
56. Cf. 339 So. 2d at 1118-19 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
57. Act of May 29, 1895, ch. 4357, §§ 1-2, 1895 Fla. Laws 123, as amended by Act of May
22, 1903, ch. 5264, § 1, 1903 Fla. Laws 257 (repealed 1941).
58. MANAGING MADNESS, supra note 17, at 107-08. Miller suggests that a jury trial is very
important in introducing community values into the commitment process and that a jury
trial should be mandatory on request.
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mentally ill person is examined by two doctors, and the judge alone
determines whether the person meets the criteria for involuntary
hospitalization. There is no participation by the lay community in
the commitment process in 1978, as there was in 1908. Only profes-
sionals such as doctors, lawyers, and judges are involved."
As courts so often do, the Jones court chose the convenient course
of relying on ancient precedent as the basis for its decision. Surely
the court could have looked beyond precedent in the light of the
substantial differences which now prevail in the commitment pro-
cess. In 1908, the community was involved in Scudamore's commit-
ment, and that may have justified the Scudamore decision. A jury
trial may indeed have been unnecessary given the statutory require-
ments of the time.
But in Jones there was no community involvement. Her fellow
citizens had no say in the fate of Mabel Jones. And perhaps this
made a difference in the outcome of her case. The court could have
pointed to this as a basis for distinguishing the two cases and hold-
ing that a jury trial is necessary in civil commitment proceedings
today. Instead, the Jones court uncritically chose the easier path.
V. THE CASE FOR JURY TRIALS ON REQUEST
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia now make some
statutory provision for a jury trial in civil commitment proceedings.
In some states it is discretionary, while in others it is mandatory."0
59. During the 1976 session of the Florida Legislature, Senator Lori Wilson from Brevard
County introduced Senate Bill 239, which provided for a jury trial in civil commitment
proceedings. FLA. S. JoUR. 39 (1976). This provision was retained in a Committee Substitute
for the bill but was amended out in a Committee Substitute for the Committee Substitute
for Senate Bill 239. FLA. S. JOUR. 252 (1976).
60. The following state statutes provide for a jury trial in civil commitment proceedings:
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.070(h) (1975). Upon the patient's written request, a jury of six will
be summoned.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5302 (West 1972). If the patient is to be held longer than 14
days, he has the right to demand a jury trial.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-109(3) (1973). The patient is entitled to a jury trial if after short-
term treatment for five months the person in charge of treatment files a petition for long-
term care.
D.C. CODE §§ 21-544 to 545 (1973). If a person is found mentally ill after an initial hearing
before the Commission on Mental Health, he may demand a jury trial in the subsequent
hearing before the court.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 2, § 9-2 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977). The patient may request
a jury of six.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2917 (Supp. 48-101 1975). A six-person jury will be summoned on
the patient's request.
Ky. REv. STAT. § 202A.080 (1977). When a petition is filed for a 360 day involuntary
hospitalization, the court must impanel a jury unless the patient waives his right to a jury
trial.
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A trend in this direction seems to be developing. Only recently, two
states added this procedural safeguard to their mental health stat-
utes.' Well-known commentators in the field also advocate the use
of jury trials in commitment proceedings. 2 Therefore, while techni-
cally Florida follows the majority view on the question of jury trials
in commitment proceedings, the majority is only a slight one, and
there may be a trend to the contrary.
Civil commitment entails extremely serious consequences for the
person committed, to say the least. It is altogether appropriate for
the community, and not solely a handful of professionals, to make
the commitment decision. Because civil commitment involves a
great loss of personal freedom, community participation through the
jury is necessary in this important decision. 3 The community as a
MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 15(c) (1972). After a patient has been hospitalized involuntarily,
he may file a petition for release, and he may request a jury trial at that time.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1453(2) (1975). A jury will be impanelled on demand.
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 38o1305(6) (Cum. Supp. vol. 3, pt. 1 1975). The patient may
request a jury trial.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-42 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). The judge may in his discretion
call a jury.
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, ch. 279, § 11, 1977 N.M. Laws 2177.
The patient has the right to a six-person jury trial for commitments of more than 17 days.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 31.35 (McKinney 1976): A person who is denied release or who
is unsatisfied with a retention order may ask for a review of the proceedings. At that time a
jury must be summoned to try the question of mental illness unless a jury trial is waived.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 54.1(B)(8) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). A jury of six may
be demanded.
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-48 (Vernon 1958). A jury is summoned unless a waiver
is filed.
VA. CODE'§ 37.1-67.6 (Supp. 1977). A person who is involuntarily committed can appeal to
the circuit court in the jurisdiction where he is committed. The appeal is held de novo, and
the person is entitled to a jury trial.
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.300 (Supp. 1976). In a petition for 90 day treatment, the patient
may request a jury trial.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(12) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). The patient is entitled to a six-
person jury on demand.
Wvo. STAT. § 25-60(i) (1957). The patient may request a jury, or the court may call a six-
person jury at the request of the next of kin or the patient's attorney.
In Maine, the court makes the commitment decision, but it may order a public hearing on
the request of a patient or a member of the patient's family. ME. REv. STAT. tit. 34, § 2334
(Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
61. Montana added this provision in 1975. New Mexico added it in 1977.
62. See MANAGING MADNESS, supra note 17; Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Prob-
lems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945, 963, 970 (1959); Szasz, Civil Liberties and the
Mentally Ill, 9 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 399 (1960).
63. It should be noted that FLA. STAT. § 394.467(5)(c) (1977) guarantees a jury trial to
persons committed to a mental hospital because of acquittal of a crime by reason of insanity.
The patient or the state's attorney may request a jury trial when the patient is to be released.
The trial is solely to determine if the patient still meets the criteria for involuntary hospitali-
zations listed in FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1) (1977). The Jones court rejected an equal protection
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whole will invariably be diminished by the departure and confine-
ment of one of its law-abiding members, however mentally ill that
person may be. Is it too much to ask for a community voice in the
making of such a drastic decision? Were trained professionals alone
capable of determining whether Mabel Jones should lose her
freedom?
Historically, the function of the jury has been to prevent arbitrary
decisions and to introduce community values into the decisionmak-
ing process." These two functions are as important in a commit-
ment proceeding as in a criminal proceeding. Both proceedings in-
volve potentially devastating consequences. Juries in criminal pro-
ceedings long have dealt with the difficult issue of whether the
individual should be removed from society. 5 The basic issue in a
civil commitment proceeding is the same. And, while certainly there
are compelling reasons for trained professionals to participate in
such proceedings, those reasons surely do not compel the absolute
exclusion of the rest of the community.
Civil commitment is similar in many ways to criminal imprison-
ment. 6 "ITIhe degree of confinement, the loss of civil rights, the
argument based on this jury trial provision by saying that "[tihere is a valid distinction
between a regular civil commitment proceeding and a hearing which is held in connection
with a criminal case wherein a defendant was acquitted for cause of insanity." In re Jones,
339 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1661 (1977). Though the court did
nqt elaborate on this "valid distinction," the state contended in its brief that the purpose of
a jury trial before releasing a person committed because of acquittal by insanity is to protect
society. The jury's purpose is to determine if the patient is fully recovered before he is allowed
to return to the community. Both proceedings involve a loss of personal freedom, but it could
be argued that the deprivation of freedom is more severe in the original civil commitment
proceeding than in the criminal proceeding. In the civil proceeding, the person has not yet
been hospitalized, while in the criminal proceeding, hospitalization has already occurred. See
also O'Brien v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 13 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1976), in which a
California court held that Youth Authority Wards and the mentally retarded were entitled
to a jury trial in commitment proceedings on equal protection grounds because all other
groups subject to involuntary commitment received this right.
64. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190, 1292 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment]. This article includes a very
thorough treatment of involuntary commitment.
65. Note, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Under Florida's Baker Act:
Procedural Due Process and the Role of the Attorney, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 508, 517 (1974).
While this note does not advise mandatory jury trials, it suggests that the decision should be
left to the alleged mentally ill person and his attorney.
66. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 3 (DHEW Pub. No.
[ADM] 76-176, 1975); Elliot, Procedures for Involuntary Commitment on the Basis of Al-
leged Mental Illness, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 231, 253 (1970); Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental
Illness, 7 CRIM. LAW BULL. 101, 108-09 (1971). Elliot postulates that commitment proceedings
are deemed "civil" rather than criminal to avoid the inconvenience of having to deal with
criminal procedural protections. He suggests that the proceeding should be viewed in terms
of the "interests at stake," and that the same safeguards should be employed in commitment
and criminal proceedings. Ennis states that "[iut is the belief of the Civil Liberties Union
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inability of the confined to communicate easily with the outside,
and the resulting social ostracism, all tend to support the law's
insistence that involuntary commitment to a mental institution is
by its very nature quite analogous to imprisonment." 7 "To be ac-
cused of 'mental' illness is analogous to being accused of a wrong-
doing or crime, such as, say, theft, assault, or murder.""8 Thus, in
many respects, and even today, being mentally ill is much like being
a criminal in the eyes of society.
The most fundamental deprivation which results from civil com-
mitment is the restriction of liberty. 9 When a person is committed,
not only is he restricted to the confines of an institution, but also
his movements within the institution itself may be restricted. 0 The
United States Supreme Court, in dealing with the commitment of
a sex offender, recognized that where such a "massive curtailment
of liberty" is involved, the jury's introduction of community values
into the commitment decision is important.7 In Duncan v.
Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court held that a person
convicted of a simple battery, which carried a maximum sentence
of two years, was entitled to a jury trial.7" The court emphasized the
length of the possible sentence in concluding that a jury trial was
required by the sixth amendment. Though the sixth amendment
does not apply to commitment proceedings, the court's reasoning in
Duncan applies to civil commitments as well as to criminal proceed-
ings. Many civil commitments last much longer than two years and
involve the same basic loss of freedom as imprisonment.73
that before a person can be deprived of liberty because of mental illness he must be afforded
substantially all of the procedural safeguards he would have received had he been accused of
crime." Compare with Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57
Nw. U.L. REV. 383, 386-92 (1962). While Kutner acknowledges the similarities between civil
commitment and criminal incarceration, he advocates the elimination of jury trials in com-
mitment proceedings.
67. Kutner, supra note 66, at 386-87.
68. Szasz, Civil Liberties and the Mentally Ill, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 399, 401 (1960). Szasz
is a major proponent of the contention that an accusation of mental illness leads to the same
consequences as an accusation of a criminal offense. He advocates a Bill of Rights for the
mentally ill which would afford the same protections as those given to someone accused of a
crime. See generally Szasz, Involuntary Psychiatry, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 347 (1976) (discussing
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 [1975]); Szasz, A Psychiatrist Views Mental Health
Legislation, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 224 (1970); Szasz, Justice in the Therapeutic State, 3 IND. LEGAL
F. 20 (1969). But cf. A. STONE, supra note 66, at 18-19 (would allow abrogation of procedural
safeguards when benefits are provided which "ameliorate human suffering").
69. Civil Commitment, supra note 64, at 1193.
70. Id. at 1194.
71. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
72. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
73. For all age groups in the states which publish data, the median length of stay for
patients in state and county mental hospitals is from 4.5 to 8.6 years. The length of the stay
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Justice Boyd, the sole dissenter in Jones, observed that "[t]hose
whose liberty is restrained by walls, fences and guards have little
concern about whether their freedom is restrained because of crime
or mental illness." 4 Boyd also noted that people are civilly commit-
ted without the "constitutional safeguards granted to the most vi-
cious criminals." 5 To remedy this "inherently unfair" situation, he
argued that a jury trial should be provided on request in commit-
ment proceedings." Unfortunately his arguments were not heeded
by the rest of the court.
Despite the similarity in consequences between criminal incarcer-
ation and civil commitment, persons who are imprisoned for crimes
receive more due process protections than those who are committed
in civil proceedings." Long-term detention for a crime against the
state is permitted only in conjunction with the most stringent con-
stitutional protections. 8 Yet persons who are committed to state
institutions in civil proceedings are not given all these protections,
even though many times their behavior involves no offense against
the state or any person. 9 The Baker Act has provided more of these
protections than were provided in the past. But the most important
right of all remains unsecured-the right to a jury trial.
The probable explanation for this differing treatment of those
who are accused of crimes and those who are suspected of mental
illness can be found in two legal theories-the police power of the
state and parens patriae. The police power is inherent in the sover-
eignty of the state and includes the right of the state to protect itself
from danger.8 The problem of applying the police power in the area
increases with age. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practi-
cal Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1108, 1113 n.16 (1972). By
comparison, the average sentence served in Florida state prisons by inmates who were re-
leased in 1975-1976 was 2.38 years. Bureau of Planning, Research & Statistics, Florida Dep't
of Offender Rehabilitation, Report, Comparison of Average Maximum Sentence and Average
Time Served (Dec. 15, 1976). FLA. STAT. § 394.467(3) (1977) provides for an initial commit-
ment not to exceed six months. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(4) (1977) provides for continuing hospi-
talization on a year-to-year basis.
74. 339 So. 2d at 1119.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 19 How. L.J. 205, 209-10 (1976). This case comment discusses O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975), in which the Supreme Court held that a person may not be confined
merely because he has a mental illness if he is not dangerous to society and if he can live
safely outside the institution. See discussion note 24 supra.
78. 19 How. L.J. 205, 209 (1976).
79. Comment, The Crime of Mental Illness: Extension of Criminal Procedural Safeguards
to Involuntary Civil Commitment, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 255, 258 (1975). This author
suggests that civil commitment and criminal incarceration have the same results.
80. Postel, Civil Commitment: A Functional Analysis, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 28 (1971).
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of civil commitment consists of defining the type of "danger" to
which this broad power extends. Historically, the police power has
been used to protect the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the
people." For example, the police power has been exercised to pre-
vent the spread of disease by requiring vaccinations for school chil-
dren and by quarantining people to prevent epidemics.8 2 The only
sanctions which the state can impose for failure to comply with the
exercise of state power in such situations is deprivation of political
or social privileges." The state cannot compel a person to submit
to treatment or to submit to restraint, as it can in the case of mental
illness.
In civil commitment, the state employs the police power in part
to protect its citizens from bodily harm.84 While this is certainly a
legitimate goal, science has not yet developed an accurate method
for predicting dangerous behavior. Numerous studies have shown
that psychiatrists tend to over-predict violence.85 These exaggerated
predictions have resulted in the needless commitment of undanger-
ous people. The Mental Health Law Project suggests that rather
than eliminating dangerousness as a ground for commitment, the
process should be improved by "enhanc[ing] the accuracy of fact-
finding and. . . limit[ing] both the scope and duration of commit-
ment . "86 This seems both a worthwhile and humane sugges-
tion.
In its exercise of the police power, the state may also be trying to
protect citizens from harm other than bodily harm. This use of the
police power is questionable. The societal interests at stake here are
less important than preventing physical violence, and the prediction
problem is even greater than that involved in predicting violent
behavior.87 "[Ilnstruments for identifying persons who will cause
mental disorders in others do not exist."88 Despite the less important
societal interests and the great difficulty of predicting such behav-
81. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 31 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1947).
82. Postel, supra note 80, at 28.
83. Id. at 28-29.
84. Mental Health Law Project, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Proposals for
Change-Civil Commitment, in 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 77, 83 (1977).
85. For a summary of the studies, see id. at 83-84.
86. Id. at 84. The Mental Health Law Project suggests that the fact-finding process should
be improved by requiring that only persons who have engaged in or threatened dangerous
behavior be subject to commitment. The Project also suggests that past violence must have
been recent and predicted violence imminent. Finally, the Project suggests that the commit-
ment period should be strictly limited. For a detailed discussion, see id. at 84-86.
87. MANAGING MADNESS, supra note 17, at 66-67; Mental Health Law Project, supra note
84, at 86.
88. Mental Health Law Project, supra note 84, at 86.
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ior, Florida does expressly allow commitment if "the person is likely
to inflict emotional injury to another."8 While this vague standard
has been upheld by the Florida Supreme Court, 0 it nevertheless
encompasses a very broad range of behavior and might allow unnec-
essary commitments.
The other legal theory invoked to justify civil commitment with-
out the due process rights accorded the criminally accused is parens
patriae. Parens patriae concepts are a legacy of the English consti-
tutional system.9 "[T]he term was used to refer to the King's
power as guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for them-
selves."92 Today the parens patriae concept has come to mean that
the state may exercise control over those persons "who are incapable
of caring for their own interest,"93 or who may attempt to commit
suicide or inflict harm on themselves.94
The basis of the parens patriae theory is that the state is acting
to help the mentally ill person, not to punish him. Therefore, all the
rigorous safeguards of criminal procedure are supposedly unnec-
essary. 5 This paternalistic reasoning is clearly prejudgmental.1" The
person has not yet been found to meet the commitment criteria, but
already the state insists it must "help" him. Undoubtedly, there are
many instances in which the state should intervene on behalf of an
individual who is simply unable to help himself. To a certain extent,
both paternalism and prejudgment may indeed be necessary. But
such benign intervention would seem far more just and far more
legitimate if at least a fair representation of a cross section of the
community were involved.
In In re Ballay,97 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit discussed the doctrine of parens patriae when determining
whether the proof of mental illness necessary for involuntary civil
commitment must be beyond a reasonable doubt (as in criminal
89. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1977).
90. Id.
91. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
92. Id. (footnote omitted).
93. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
94. Mental Health Law Project, supra note 84, at 87.
95. In Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), certain procedures for
involuntary commitment were held constitutionally defective. The court traced the history
of the parens patriae theory relating to commitment because of mental illness and held that
regardless of this theory, procedural due process requirements must be met. See also
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), in which the parens patriae power was not
sufficient to allow a state to confine an undangerous person who was not receiving treatment.
96. See Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Under Florida's Baker Act: Proce-
dural Due Process and the Role of the Attorney, supra note 65, at 516.
97. 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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proceedings) or merely a preponderance of the evidence (as in civil
proceedings). The court held that the proper standard was proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and based its decision on the great re-
striction of liberty involved in a civil commitment. 8 Despite the
state's intent to provide treatment for the individual, the court
found that a restriction of liberty was still punitive in nature:
Measures which subject individuals to substantial and involuntary
deprivation of their liberty are essentially punitive in character,
and this reality is not altered by the facts that the motivations that
prompt incarceration are to provide therapy or otherwise contrib-
ute to the person's well-being or reform. As such, these measures
must be closely scrutinized to assure that power is being applied
consistently with those values of the community that justify inter-
ferences with liberty for only the most clear and compelling rea-
sons.
99
The jury is the traditional vehicle for expressing community values.
The same prediction problems encountered with the police power
are also present with parens patriae. Studies show that the need for
hospitalization due to inability to care for one's self is over-
predicted.' 0 Even if the person is unable to care for himself, less
drastic measures than commitment may be appropriate."°" When
the parens patriae power is used to prevent an individual from com-
mitting suicide or inflicting bodily harm on himself, the prediction
problem is again apparent. "The literature on predicting suicide
shows that mental health professionals will predict self-destruction
several times more frequently than it actually occurs."''0
Because of these predictability problems and the drastic curtail-
ment of liberty involved in commitment, the state's police power
and parens patriae power should be used only when absolutely nec-
essary. In order to determine if state intervention is necessary, a jury
should be summoned to weigh and evaluate the many factors in-
98. Id. at 650.
99. Id. at 667 (emphasis added).
100. National Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Dep't of HEW, Draft, Mental Health
Legislative Guide, Mental Health Law Project 34D. The Guide would require that before the
state can intervene there must be a serious disorder and a present course of conduct that is
causing serious harm.
101. See discussion of the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative in text accompanying
notes 121-27 infra. While the resident patient population in the nation's state mental hospi-
tals has decreased in recent years (from 559,000 in 1955 to 308,000 in 1971), the admission
and readmission rate has risen (836,000 people treated in 1971). A steadily increasing number
of people are going through the state mental hospitals. MANAGING MADNESS, supra note 17,
at 3.
102. Mental Health Law Project, supra note 84, at 87.
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volved in the commitment process. To be sure, trained professional
judgment is essential, but community values should also be consid-
ered in determining if the drastic measure of commitment is really
needed.
Personal liberty is not all that is at stake in a civil commitment
proceeding. Basic civil rights may also be forfeited.' In some states,
commitment is an automatic adjudication of incompetency. An ad-
judication of incompetency entails the loss of some legal rights. In
Florida, however, the issue of competency is separate from the issue
of whether admission to a residential care facility is appropriate. 04
But section 394.467(3) of the Florida Statutes does provide that a
person may be adjudicated incompetent at the same hearing at
which he is committed. 105 If this nonjury procedure were followed, a
person could not only be committed and suffer a loss of liberty, but
also could be adjudicated incompetent and suffer an additional loss
of legal rights.'"6 In theory, though, a person who is civilly commit-
ted in Florida may still exercise all his legal rights unless he has
been officially adjudicated incompetent.
Equally drastic is the social stigma attached to a person who has
been involuntarily committed. 107 The Ballay court concluded that
the social stigma surrounding mental illness may be even greater
103. See Civil Commitment, supra note 64, at 1198.
104. FLA. STAT. § 393.12 (1977). Though § 393.12 specifically refers to mental retardation,
it would probably apply by analogy to mental disability as well.
105. (1977).
106. See FLA. STAT. § 744.331 (1977) for the proceedings necessary for an adjudication of
incompetency and id. § 744.464 for the proceedings necessary for a restoration of competency.
Incompetence in Florida is present when a person "is incapable of caring for himself or
managing his property or is likely to dissipate his property or inflict harm on himself or others
.... Id. § 744.331(1). The standards for incompetency and the standards for involuntary
commitment are quite similar, except that a person may be adjudged incompetent if he is
incapable of managing his property.
An adjudication of incompetency in Florida is strong evidence, though not sufficient for a
directed verdict, that the person lacked testamentary capacity. "Any person 18 or more years
of age who is of sound mind may make a will." id. § 732.501 (emphasis added). Nor may a
person who has been adjudged incompetent in Florida practice certain professions. Id. §
459.14(l)(i) (osteopathy); id. § 464.21(2)(a) (nursing); id. § 465.101(1)(d)(3) (pharmacy); id.
§ 466.24(1) (dentistry). An incompetent may not vote, FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; FLA. STAT. §
97.041(3)(a) (1977), serve on a jury, id. §§ 40.01(3), .07(3), or obtain a driver's license, id. §§
322.05(5), .27(1)(c).
107. Civil Liberties and the Mentally Ill, supra note 68, at 407. Szasz observes that the
penalty for mental illness is "social ostracism, loss of employment or friends, personal enmi-
ties." See also Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); A. BROOKS, LAW,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 646 (1974); B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY:
MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LAW 145-76 (1972); MANAGING MADNESS, supra note
17, at 10; Sarkin & Mancuso, Failure of a Moral Enterprise: Attitudes of the Public Toward
Mental Illness, 35 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 159 (1970).
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than that surrounding the commission of a crime."°' The mental
patient may be treated with "distrust and even loathing; he may be
socially ostracized and victimized by employment and educational
discrimination.' ' 19 Despite society's supposed enlightenment re-
garding mental illness, "sanctioned incarceration" and separation
from society are usually taken to mean that the person is bad or
evil.1' 0 For example, "[law enforcement officials might view a
prior commitment as a reason for viewing otherwise innocuous be-
havior with suspicion . . . ."I" In addition, the individual who is
committed may begin to feel degraded and demeaned."' Institution-
alization may cause him to lose self-confidence and self-esteem.
1 3
The ever-present possibility of wrongful commitment is another
compelling reason to grant a jury trial on request. In Quesnell v.
State, the Washington Supreme Court observed that "the jury plays
an essential role in guarding against wrongful commitment
... ,'"1 Without the procedural safeguard of a jury trial, sane
people may be "railroaded" into institutions."' However rare wrong-
ful commitment may be, the jury "is an additional buffer against
wrongful deprivation of liberty.""' 6 Institutionalization can have
devastating side effects on those who are not in need of treatment."7
The assurance of a jury trial as a prerequisite to civil commitment
would help avoid the need for dealing with such side effects.
108. 482 F.2d at 668.
109. Civil Commitment, supra note 64, at 1200.
110. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 30 U. Prrr. L. REV. 752, 768 (1969). See
also sources cited note 107 supra.
111. Civil Commitment, supra note 64, at 1199.
112. Comment, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for Involuntary Commit-
ment and Release, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 633, 637 (1967). This author notes that involuntary
commitment can produce disastrous effects in the patient. See also In re Ballay, 482 F.2d
648, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973); B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIA-
TRISTS AND THE LAW 215 (1972) (stating that many persons committed to mental hospitals
actually get worse); MANAGING MADNESS, supra note 17, at 10 (noting that being labelled
mentally ill can set up a self-fulfilling prophecy which increases the chance of mental illness).
For an expos6 on the demeaning and degrading conditions existing at Florida State Hos-
pital at Chattahoochee where Ms. Jones was confined, see Tallahassee Democrat, March 19,
1978, § A, at 1, col. 3; id. at col. 4; id., March 20, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 1; id. at col. 2; id.,
March 21, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 4.
113. Civil Commitment, supra note 64, at 1200.
114. 517 P.2d 568, 579 (Wash. 1974). The Quesnell court held that where the right to a
jury trial in commitment proceedings is guaranteed by the state, the jury trial cannot be
waived without the consent of the person charged.
115. See 145 A.L.R. 711 (1943) for a collection of "railroad" cases.
116. 517 P.2d at 579 n.22.
117. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d at 667. Justice Boyd, dissenting in Jones, stated that "[it is
well recognized that unsupported allegations of insanity can have a detrimental effect upon
the personal lives and careers of people. It should not be left to the discretion of a single judge
to make determinations of such allegations." 339 So. 2d at 1119.
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The jury plays an important role in making sure that medical
judgments are not the only criteria used to determine the necessity
of commitment."8 Commitment is very often a social problem rather
than a medical one, as Jones illustrates all too well. A jury repre-
senting a cross section of the community is best qualified to view
medical opinions in the light of a patient's social situation."' Com-
mitment should not be based solely on whether a mental illness is
present, but on whether the mental illness is severe enough to re-
quire the state to intervene. This question could best be answered
by a jury.'2
Several alternatives short of commitment may be available to the
court if the jury decides a person's condition does not warrant the
drastic action of commitment. Indeed, the use of the "least restric-
tive alternative" has actually been required in some circumstances.
The leading case expounding the concept of the least restrictive
alternative is Shelton v. Tucker. 2 In Shelton, the United States
Supreme Court struck a statute which required every teacher to file
an affidavit listing every organization to which he had belonged
within the past five years. The Court stated that "even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental per-
sonal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. 12 2
Though Shelton dealt with the right of free association guaran-
teed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Shelton rationale has been applied in commitment cases. For exam-
ple, in Covington v. Harris the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit discussed a civilly committed person's habeas
corpus petition and said, "the principle of the least restrictive alter-
native consistent with the legitimate purposes of a commitment
inheres in the very nature of civil commitment, which entails an
extraordinary deprivation of liberty ... " 3 The rationale for the
least restrictive alternative was also applied in Lessard v. Schmidt,
in which the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
said that full-time involuntary hospitalization should be used only
as a last resort and that "persons suffering from the condition of
118. Civil Commitment, supra note 64, at 1293.
119. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv.
945, 963, 970 (1959). This author suggests that a jury trial be granted on request. See also
Comment, The New Mental Health Codes: Safeguards in Compulsory Commitment and
Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 977, 1000-02 (1967).
120. BRAKL & ROCK, supra note 6, at 54.
121. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
122. Id. at 488 (footnote omitted).
123. 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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being mentally ill, but who are not alleged to have committed any
crime, cannot be totally deprived of their liberty if there are less
drastic means for achieving the same basic goal . ... "Ill
A less restrictive alternative might involve allowing the patient to
remain in the community and live at home while receiving appropri-
ate treatment on an out-patient basis. For a person living alone, a
visiting nurse or other home service may be all that is necessary. 125
There is also the possibility of day hospital care or night hospital
care, as well as foster homes and halfway homes. 2' Such community
mental health programs are often very effective and can avoid the
demoralizing effects of institutionalization.'2
VI. OBJECTIONS TO THE JURY TRIAL
Ironically, a major objection to the use of jury trials in civil com-
mitment proceedings is that the trial will have a traumatic effect
on the alleged mentally ill person.12 This objection to the use of jury
124. 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563 (1975); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Dixon v. Weinburger, 405 F.
Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975); In re Jones, 338 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1975). But cf. State v.
Sanchez, 457 P.2d 370, 373 (N.M. 1969), in which the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
in the absence of a provision in the statute it is the duty of the court to explore alternatives
in lieu of institutionalization, the court will not do so.
In Florida, see In re Smith, 342 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1977), in which the patient was found
mentally ill, but the supreme court remanded for a consideration of alternatives less restric-
tive than commitment. But cf. Gorchov v. State, 331 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(rejected argument that involuntary hospitalization statute, FLA. STAT. § 394.467 [1975], is
overly broad because it does not provide some relief short of confinement); Department of
Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Owen, 305 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (held that
trial court does not have authority to direct department to provide treatment or supervise
treatment and placement of an individual). The Gorchov court stated that lack of provision
for alternatives was an argument for legislative rather than judicial action.
For a discussion of alternatives to commitment and constitutional imperatives of the least
restrictive alternative, see Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107 (1972).
125. Chambers, supra note 124, at 1118.
126. Id.
127. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1096, for a list of alternatives which that
court found feasible. The number of involuntary commitments in Florida has risen in the past
three years. In 1974-1975 and 1975-1976, there were 3,174 involuntary commitments in Flor-
ida. DIvISION OF MENTAL HEALTH, FLORIDA DEP'T OF HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, STA-
TISTICAL REPORT OF HOSPITALS 15 (1975); DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH, FLORIDA DEP'T OF
HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, STATISTICAL REPORT OF HOSPITALS 15 (1976). In 1976-1977,
this number rose to 3,560. DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH, FLORIDA DEP'T OF HEALTH & REHABILI-
TATIVE SERVICES, STATISTICAL REPORT ON HOSPITALS 15 (1977). (For purposes of comparison, as
of February 6, 1978, there were 19,266 inmates in Florida's state prisons. Florida Dep't of
Offender Rehabilitation, Inmate Population Data Report to Governor Reubin O'D. Askew
[Feb. 6, 1978]). The steady increase in involuntary commitments illustrates the need for
some alternatives to involuntary hospitalization.
128. Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally III, 50 MICH. L. REV. 837, 848 (1952). Weihofen
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trials assumes its own conclusion. The person has been deemed
mentally ill before the hearing has begun-before any evidence has
been presented. The argument presupposes that person will ulti-
mately be committed. 19 As the Ballay court suggested, perception
of the civil proceeding "as identical to a criminal trial is indeed
unfortunate . . . ."10 The purpose of a jury trial is to make sure the
"accused" receives the opportunity to be heard by an unbiased
group of his peers. 3'
Concern for the individual's family is another argument advanced
against the use of jury trials in civil commitment proceedings. It is
contended that the person's relatives will be reluctant to expose
their problems before the jury-the family will feel ashamed and
disgraced. 32 The purpose of a commitment proceeding is to deter-
mine if commitment is necessary in a certain individual's case. If
this purpose can be accomplished more fairly through the use of a
jury, the individual's relatives should not be permitted to stand in
the way. The law's primary concern should be the person who faces
the drastic consequences of commitment. Perhaps if the family
knew the case could be tried before a jury, they would seek alterna-
tives to commitment more actively.
"Public" commitment is another objection raised against the use
of jury trials in civil commitment proceedings. It is hypothesized
that when the individual recovers and returns to society, he will be
subjected to much emotional stress because he was "publicly" com-
mitted. 3 3 This criticism, aside from again presupposing that the
person will be committed, is inconsequential in view of the social
stigma attached to all persons who are committed to a mental insti-
tution, regardless of whether the commitment is by a judge or by a
jury. The jury should be allowed to play its proper role as interpreter
of community values in the commitment proceeding, as it does in
criminal trials.
Yet another common objection to the use of jury trials in civil
commitment proceedings is that a lay jury is not qualified to resolve
the issue of mental illness. 34 This argument relates to the function
favors doing away with the jury trial in civil commitment proceedings. It is worth noting that
jury trials may have a traumatic effect on sane persons as well.
129. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
130. Id. at 664.
131. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(3)(a) (1977) provides that the court may serve notice on the
state attorney. His appearance emphasizes the adversary nature of the proceedings, regard-
less of the presence or absence of a jury.
132. Weihofen, supra note 128, at 848-49.
133. Id. at 849.
134. Id.
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of the jury itself. The jury's function in commitment proceedings is
not to diagnose mental illness but rather to evaluate the diagnosis
of medical experts together with all the other facts and then decide
if commitment is necessary. The jurors are "not required to make a
medical diagnosis of the alleged mentally ill person. They are re-
quired only to decide, on the basis of expert medical testimony,
whether the condition of the proposed patient is such that his com-
mitment is justified . . . ..." Juries routinely make difficult deci-
sions. As Justice Boyd pointed out in his dissent in In re Jones,
"[w]henever insanity is used as a defense for crime, juries evaluate
and determine the question [of insanity] .. . ."Ill Why is it appro-
priate for a jury to make such a determination in a criminal proceed-
ing but not in a civil proceeding?
The real reason jury trials are discouraged in civil commitment
proceedings may not be concern so much for the individual, or for
his family, or about the qualifications of a lay jury, but rather con-
cern about the considerable cost of reform. Jury trials are time-
consuming and expensive. The legislature may be reluctant to im-
pose this delay and this additional expense on the public. Perhaps
the Jones court was reluctant as well. But commitment is a legal
procedure. As such, it should include the same safeguards as other
legal procedures which involve the same consequences. Addition-
ally, "[t]he notion remains firm in English and American law that
juries are the best instrument for ascertaining matters when per-
sonal liberty is at stake . ... "Ill
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The severe consequences of involuntary commitment-depriva-
tion of liberty, loss of civil rights, social stigma, loss of self-esteem,
possible wrongful commitment-require community participation
in the commitment decision. A jury trial should be granted when
requested. 13 If community values had been applied in Jones, per-
135. Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568, 579 (Wash. 1974).
136. 339 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1661 (1977).
137. Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Under Florida's Baker Act, supra note
65, at 516.
138. In the District of Columbia a jury trial may be requested if the Commission on
Mental Health recommends commitment. From June 1967 to June 1968, the Commission
heard 848 cases and recommended commitment in 673 cases. One hundred thirty-one of the
673 patients requested jury trials. Eighty-one of these never went to trial; thirty-nine with-
drew their requests; four were released as improved. In 38 cases, the Commission reversed
itself and released the individual. Civil Commitment, supra note 58, at 1293 n.168. These
statistics lead to the inference that jury trials, or at least the opportunity to demand them,
prevent some unnecessary commitments.
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haps another, less drastic alternative could have been found which
would have proved helpful to an elderly woman no one seemed to
want. The Florida Supreme Court had an opportunity in Jones to
correct this deficiency in the Baker Act. That opportunity was
missed. Now it is up to the legislature to incorporate a provision for
jury trial upon request into section 394.467 of the Florida Statutes,
so that appropriate procedural safeguards will be available to those
individuals such as Mabel Jones who confront the severe conse-
quences of civil commitment.'39
139. For examples of statutes which grant jury trials on request, see sources cited notes
59-60, 65 supra; Mental Health Law Project, supra note 84, at 131 (Model Statute).

